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Abstract
We offer a rational expectations model of the dynamics of innovative industries. The fundamental
value of innovations is uncertain and one must learn whether they are solid or fragile. Also, when the
industry is new, it is difficult to monitor managers and make sure they exert the effort necessary to
reduce default risk. This gives rise to moral hazard. In this context, initial successes spur optimism
and growth. But increasingly confident managers end up requesting large rents. If these become
too high, investors give up on incentives, and default risk rises. Thus, moral hazard gives rise to
endogenous crises and fat tails in the distribution of aggregate default risk. We calibrate our model
to fit the stylized facts of the MBS industry’s boom and bust cycle.
2
1 Introduction
Innovation waves often spur boom and bust cycles. Uncertainty, learning and information asymmetry
are key features of such waves. We offer a dynamic rational expectations model where they generate
initial growth, followed by rents, fat tails in the distribution of aggregate defaults and endogenous
crises.
In our model, the value of the innovation is uncertain and agents progressively learn about it.4
With some probability the innovation is robust, otherwise it is fragile. In the former case, default risk
in the innovative sector is low, while in the latter case it is somewhat larger. As time goes by and the
performance of the innovative sector is observed, investors and managers conduct rational Bayesian
learning. When low aggregate default rates are observed, beliefs about the strength of the innovative
sector improve. This leads to an increase in its size, as well as in the compensation of its managers.
In contrast, if defaults are frequent, this generates pessimism and leads to a decline in the size of the
innovative sector.5
In practice, innovative sectors are likely to be plagued by information asymmetries. It is hard for
outsiders to understand everything insiders do, and to precisely monitor their actions. We assume
that, in the innovative sector, each manager must exert costly and unobservable effort to reduce the
probability of failure of his project.6 For example, one can think of the project as investing in a
portfolio of CDOs. If the manager exerts effort, he carefully scrutinizes the quality of the paper he
invests in. Alternatively, the manager can opt for risk—taking and fail to exert the effort requested
by such an analysis. In that case he would rely on ready made evaluations, such as those obtained
from credit rating agencies. Furthermore, managers are assumed to have limited liability. This curbs
the ability to punish failure. Hence, to provide incentives for risk—prevention effort, investors must
promise rewards to agents in case of success. When the moral hazard problem is severe, such rewards
4 In our analysis, uncertainty means that the parameters are not known for sure. Agents conduct bayesian learning
about these parameters. This differs from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), who shed light on financial crises within
a Knightian uncertainty framework.
5Thus our analysis is in line with Zeira (1987, 1999), Rob (1991), Pastor and Veronesi (2006), and Barbarino and
Jovanovic (2007), who show that learning induces fluctuations in industry size.
6 In our model, the project can be successful or fail. In the latter case it generates 0 cash and investors can’t be repaid.
This can be interpreted as default and, in our paper, the terms “failure” and ”default” will both refer to that outcome.
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are above the market clearing wage, i.e., managers in the innovative sector earn rents, although they
are competitive.
While shirking increases the probability of default, we assume that this increase in risk is stronger
when the innovation is fragile than when it is solid. This is plausible, as strong industries are likely
to be more robust to shirking than fragile ones. Under this assumption, after several years of success,
managers become very confident that the industry is solid. This makes it hard to induce them to
exert effort, as they think it likely that the project will be successful even if they shirk. Thus, after a
confidence buildup, agency rents grow very large. At some point, investors may find it cheaper to give
up on incentives, to avoid paying excessively large fees. In that case equilibrium actions switch from
effort to risk—taking.7 This switch in the equilibrium action of each individual manager distorts the
distribution of outcomes towards more frequent failures, thus it generates fat tails in the distribution of
aggregate defaults. Since the burst in aggregate default results from equilibrium actions, we interpret
it as an endogenous financial crisis. Note that, in the symmetric information version of our model,
managers always exert the risk—prevention effort and therefore there are no crises.8
Our key assumptions are particularly relevant for financial innovation waves. Because finance is
intangible and complex, learning and information asymmetry are likely to be particularly important
features of this industry. Indeed, the equilibrium dynamics arising in our model are in line with
empirical evidence on the recent financial innovation wave and ensuing crisis. In our model, initial
successes are followed by an increase in the complexity of jobs and the magnitude of rents in the
finance sector. This is consistent with the empirical results of Philippon and Resheff (2009). We offer
a calibration of our model, based on the assumption that there was no negative aggregate shock during
the heydays of the “great moderation period”, from 2002 to 2005. In this calibration, there is a switch
to the risk—taking regime in 2005. This offers a rationale for the empirical finding by Demyanyk and
Van Hemert (2008) that, for loans originated around that point in time, there is an increase in default
7 In our model, agents must choose between risk—prevention effort and shirking. In a richer model there could be several
levels of effort. In that case, the level of effort requested would decline in response to the rise in rents. Correspondingly,
there would be a sequence of equilibrium regimes, with increasingly high default risk.
8Thus our main message differs from that of Zeira (1987, 1999), Rob (1991), Pastor and Veronesi (2006), and Barbarino
and Jovanovic (2007). In their analyses, information is symmetric and crises can arise exogenously, while in our analysis
crises arise endogenously because of information asymmetry.
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risk that cannot be explained by exogenous variables. Furthermore, in the calibration, the regime
switch occuring in 2005 triggers a shift in the distribution of aggregate defaults towards more risk.
Thus, while in the effort regime aggregate default rates are between 0 and 6% in line with what has
been observed between 2002 and 2005, in the risk—taking regime, aggregate default rates vary between
12% and 28%, in line with what has been observed after 2005 (see e.g., Jaffee 2008). These figures
illustrate that in our model fat tails and endogenous crises can arise in equilibrium.
While shedding light on the potential costs of financial innovation waves, our analysis offers guid-
ance to regulators in monitoring this process. First, the switch to an equilibrium regime with risk—
taking occurs when rents in the financial sector are large. Therefore such rents offer an early signal
that systemic risk is rising. Second, without moral hazard there is no risk—taking, i.e., information
asymmmetry is at the root of the crisis. Such asymmetry can be partially mitigated by increased
transparency, in markets (e.g., exchanges versus OTC) or in the disclosure of positions and trades
(e.g., to regulators or CCPs). Third, combining the two above implications, its is particularly im-
portant to insist on transparency after waves of successful innovations, breeding high confidence and
large rents.
The next section presents our model. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark case where effort is
observable. Section 4 turns to the asymmetric information case. Section 5 presents the empirical
implications and calibration of the model. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Agents and goods
Consider an infinite horizon economy, operating in discrete time at periods t = 1, 2, ... At each period,
there is a mass one continuum of competitive managers and a mass one continuum of competitive
investors. All agents are risk neutral. The managers have limited liability and no initial wealth. At
the beginning of each period, each investor is endowed with one unit of nonstorable investment good.
At the end of each period, all agents consume the consumption good, produced, as explained below,
by labor and capital. For simplicity, we focus on the simplest possible case, where managers live and
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contract only for one period.9 Yet, the model is dynamic, to the extent that agents progressively learn
about the strength of the innovative industry. Thus, the link between generations runs through the
evolution of beliefs.
2.2 The two sectors
2.2.1 Managers and investors
There are two sectors, the traditional sector and the innovative one. Managers and investors are
heterogeneous. Their types are denoted by ν and ρ respectively. The types of the managers are
distributed over [0, ν¯]. Their cumulative distribution function is denoted by G. The types of the
investors are distributed over [0, ρ¯]. Their cumulative distribution function is denoted by F . Managers
and investors choose in which sector to operate. For simplicity we assume that, in the traditional sector,
agents generate output equal to their type. Thus, when a type ν manager operates in the traditional
sector, he obtains, at the end of the period, ν units of the consumption good. Similarly, when investor
ρ allocates her unit endowment of investment good to the traditional sector, she obtains ρ units of the
consumption good at the end of the period.
Operating the innovative technology requires one unit of investment as well as one manager.
Capital is provided by the investors, who are endowed with the investment good at the beginning
of the period. Managers, who can’t work on more than one project, are hired by investors. For
example the agent could be an investment banker, using the capital to undertake innovative financial
engineering operations, e.g., in structured finance.
2.2.2 Shocks and uncertainty
The innovative industry can be hit by negative shocks, increasing default rates. Because it’s an
innovation, in the beginning it is difficult to evaluate its profitability. To model this we assume that,
a priori, there is uncertainty about the exposure of the innovative industry to negative shocks. With
some probability the innovation is strong (an event denoted by θ = 1). In this case the likelihood of
9When players interact for several periods, shirking can create a wedge between the beliefs of investors and managers.
Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) offer insightful analyses of this problem.
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negative shocks is small and equal to 1− p¯. Alternatively, the innovation is fragile (θ = 0), in which
case the probability of negative shocks is equal to 1− p > 1− p¯.
Consider for example resecuritization techniques, such as CDOs of ABSs. They were designed to
reallocate risk, thus enhancing risk sharing and liquidity. But the reliability and effectiveness of this
innovation was not fully clear ex—ante. A strong innovation would have relatively little exposure to
shocks, so that investors holding highly ranked tranches would run relatively little risk. In contrast,
a fragile innovation would have greater exposure to negative shocks, characterized by large default
rates.
2.2.3 Moral hazard
Each firm’s output depends on the effort of its manager. Managerial effort leads to an improvement
in the distribution of output in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. This can be interpreted
in terms of risk prevention, e.g., fund managers and bankers can exert effort to screen investment
opportunities, and avoid those with a large risk of default.
First consider the case where managers exert effort. In that case, if there is no negative shock,
innovative firms obtain output Y . On the other hand, if there is a negative shock, for each innovative
firm there is a probability μ that the output is 0, while with the complementary probability output
is Y . Conditional on the negative shock, firms’ outputs are i.i.d., hence, by the law of large numbers,
there is a fraction μ of firms that fail, while the remaining 1− μ firms succeed.
Now turn to the case where the manager doesn’t exert effort. This increases the risk that output
will be 0. When the innovative industry is strong, the increase in the probability of default generated
by shirking is ∆. When the industry is fragile, this increase in the probability of default can be larger.
More precisely, with probability λ it is the same as for the solid industry (i.e. ∆), but with probability
1− λ it is ∆¯ > ∆. The expected default rate under shirking in the fragile industry (λ∆+ (1− λ)∆¯)
is denoted by ∆ˆ.10 The unfolding of uncertainty within one period is represented in Figure 1.
To illustrate the effect of shirking in fragile and strong industries, consider the resecuritization
10One could set λ to zero, so that the probability of default under shirking would always be ∆¯, without major alterations
to our results. As will be seen below, λ > 0 implies that, even when all managers shirk, the fragility of the industry may
not be discovered immediately.
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of loans. Our assumption means that when the technique is fragile (as it turned out to be the case
for CDOs of ABS), there is a probability 1 − λ that shirking (i.e. not exerting due diligence in the
screening and monitoring of borrowers) will result in high default rates. By contrast, if the innovation
is strong, shirking is less damaging. Thus, when the industry is fragile not only is it more exposed to
negative shocks, but also it is more vulnerable to shirking.
Managerial effort is not observable by investors, and, when the manager does not exert effort, she
obtains an unobservable private benefit from shirking, denoted by B. Hence, since managers have
limited liability, there is a moral hazard problem.11 The investor is the principal and the manager the
agent. We assume
∆Y > B.
which implies that it is socially optimal to exert effort to reduce default risk.
For simplicity we don’t model the details of the activities of the innovative industry. Hence,
although our modelling of that industry can be interpreted as a reduced form of the financial sector, we
don’t study explicitly financial intermediation or services to the traditional sector. This simplification
enables us to concentrate on what is the main focus of our analysis: the agency relationship between
investors and managers, the allocation of resources between the traditional sector and the innovative
one, and the possibility of endogenous crises due to moral hazard.
2.3 Learning
All the agents in the economy observe returns realizations, and use these to conduct rational Bayesian
learning about θ. At the first period (t = 1), agents start with the prior probability, π1 that θ = 1.
For t > 1, denote by πt the updated probability that the innovative industry is strong, given the
returns realized in the innovative sector at times {1, ..., t − 1}. While individual effort decisions are
unobservable, aggregate outcomes reveal useful information. In particular, all investors and managers
can tell whether there was a negative shock or not. Also, as can be seen in Figure 1, large aggregate
default rates (i.e., ∆¯ or μ + ∆¯) can only come from a fragile innovation. Thus the fragility of an
innovation is detected for sure (and πt goes to 0) when such high default rates are observed.
11As in Holmström and Tirole (1997) we cast the problem in terms of private benefits foregone by the manager when
exerting effort. One could equivalently consider a model without private benefits but where effort would be costly.
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When managers exert effort and there is no shock, all projects succeed at date t so that the
probability that the industry is strong is revised upward to:
πt+1 =
p¯πt
p¯πt + p(1− πt)
> πt. (1)
On the other hand, if managers exert effort but there is a negative shock, a fraction μ of projects
default. In that case the probability that the innovation is strong is revised downward to
πt+1 =
(1− p¯)πt
(1− p¯)πt + (1− p)(1− πt)
< πt.
If, in equilibrium, managers don’t exert effort and there is no negative shock, the aggregate default
rate is ∆¯ or ∆. ∆¯ reveals that the innovation is fragile. But, conditional on ∆, the probability that
the industry is strong is updated to:
πt+1 =
p¯πt
p¯πt + λp(1− πt)
> πt. (2)
This strong increase reflects that, in spite of shirking, the aggregate default rate was limited.
Similarly, if managers don’t exert effort in equilibrium and there is a negative shock, the aggregate
default rate is μ+ ∆¯ or μ+∆. The former reveals that the industry is fragile. But, if the aggregate
default rate is μ+∆, the probability that the industry is strong is updated as in (2).
Hence, conditionally on a given level of effort, relatively high aggregate default rates lead to a
decline in πt, while relatively low default rates lead to an increase in πt. As long as managers exert
effort, πt remains between 0 and 1. But, if shirking prevails, beliefs become more volatile: changes in
the probability that the industry is strong are larger and can lead to πt = 0.
2.4 Contracts
At time t, newly born investors and managers interact for one period. We assume they have access to
the complete performance history of the industry. Hence they share the updated belief πt.
First, consider the case where the contract incentivizes managers to exert effort. If there is no
negative shock all projects should succeed and obtain Y . Therefore, if the output of the project run
by manager i is equal to 0, while all others succeeded, it must be that manager i shirked. Hence it is
optimal to set his compensation to 0. Even when there is a negative shock, it is also optimal (because
of moral hazard and risk—neutrality ), to set compensation to 0 in case of default.
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Second, consider the case where the contract does not request managers to exert effort. In that
case, only the expected compensation of managers matters, not its allocation across states. Hence, it
is weakly optimal to compensate the manager only when the output of his firm is Y .
Accordingly, we consider contracts where managers are compensated only when their firm generates
output Y . We denote the value of this compensation at time t by mt, which can be interpreted as the
bonus received by managers when they succeed.
3 Equilibrium when effort is observable
Consider first the benchmark case where effort is observable: Managers are instructed to exert effort
and their compensation is set to clear the labor market. At time t, the expected output of firms
operating in the innovative sector is:
St = [πt(p¯+ (1− p¯)(1− μ)) + (1− πt)(p+ (1− p)(1− μ))]Y, (3)
and the expected compensation of the managers is:
Mt = [πt(p¯+ (1− p¯)(1− μ)) + (1− πt)(p+ (1− p)(1− μ))]mt,
while investors obtain St−Mt in expectation. Managers with types below Mt prefer to operate in the
innovative sector. Hence, the supply of managers for that sector is:
G(Mt). (4)
Investors with types below St −Mt prefer to invest in the innovative one, and thus need to hire a
manager. Hence, the demand for managers in the innovative sector is:
F (St −Mt). (5)
Equating (4) and (5) the labor market—clearing condition is:
G(Mt) = F (St −Mt). (6)
The supply of managers is continuous and increases from G(0) = 0 to G(ν¯) = 1, while the demand
for managers is continuous and decreases from F (St) > 0 to 0. Consequently there exists a unique
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solution M∗t to (6). In our simple model a natural measure of the size of the innovative sector is
the number of managers, or equivalently the number of firms operating in that sector. Based on the
discussion above, we state our first proposition (illustrated in Figure 2):
Proposition 1: When effort is observable, the equilibrium expected compensation of managers
in the innovative sector is M∗t (the solution of (6)) and the size of that sector is G(M∗t ).
Suppose that at the beginning of period t, managers and investors expect the industry to be strong
with probability 0 < πt < 1. If there is no negative shock during this period, then investors become
more optimistic and the updated probability that the industry is strong goes up to πt+1 > πt. Thus
expected output in the innovative sector increases and the demand curve (5) goes up, while the supply
curve (4) stays constant. Consequently, the equilibrium compensation of managers in period t+ 1 is
M∗t+1 > M
∗
t . In contrast, after a negative shock, the updated probability that the industry is strong
goes down. Consequently the size of the innovative sector shrinks. These remarks are summarized in
the following corollary:
Corollary 1: Assume effort is observable. When there is no default, the size of the innovative
sector goes up, along with the expected compensation of managers employed in that sector. When
the aggregate default rate is μ > 0, the size of the innovative sector and the expected compensation
of managers both decline.
Thus, in the benchmark case where effort is observable, learning generates fluctuations (good
realizations lead to growth in the innovative sector, while bad realizations lead to decline), but there
are no crises.
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4 Equilibrium under moral hazard
4.1 Incentive compatibility
When effort is not observable but requested, we must impose the incentive compatibility condition
that the manager prefers to exert effort rather than consuming private benefits, i.e.,:
[πt(p¯+ (1− p¯)(1− μ)) + (1− πt)(p+ (1− p)(1− μ))]mt
≥ [πt(p¯(1−∆) + (1− p¯)(1− μ−∆)) + (1− πt)(p(1− ∆ˆ) + (1− p)(1− μ− ∆ˆ))]mt +B.
This pins down the minimum incentive compatible bonus for the manager:
mt ≥
B
πt∆+ (1− πt)∆ˆ
=
B
∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)
.
This condition implies a minimum expected pay-off for the manager. Denote this minimum expected
pay-off by Rt. We refer to it as the rent of the manager:
Rt =
(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt
∆ˆ− (∆ˆ−∆)πt
B. (7)
The incentive compatibility condition can be rewritten as,
Mt ≥ Rt, (8)
which means that the expected compensation promised to the manager must be large enough to entice
effort. The rent Rt that must be left to the manager varies with the beliefs (πt) about the strength of
the innovative sector. Since ∆ˆ > ∆, (7) implies that Rt increases with πt. Because the strong industry
is more robust to shirking than the fragile one, managers find shirking more tempting when they are
confident that the industry is robust. Therefore, high rents are needed to provide incentives in that
case.
Substracting the rent from the expected output yields the pledgeable income, i.e., the maximum
expected revenue that can be pledged to the investors without compromising the incentives of the
manager:
Pt = St −Rt. (9)
Since both expected output and rents increase with πt, the pledgeable income can be non—monotonic
with the expected strength of the innovative sector. Relying on the above analysis, we obtain our next
proposition.
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Proposition 2: When effort is not observable but requested, the pledgeable income P (πt) in the
innovative sector is concave in πt . Moreover if
[(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ
∆
− (1− μ+ μp)] > μ(p¯− p)∆Y
B
> (
∆
∆ˆ
)2[(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ
∆
− (1− μ+ μp)], (10)
then the pledgeable income increases when πt is close to 0 and decreases when πt is close to 1.
As long as high returns are observed, confidence in the innovative sector increases. This boosts
expected output, but it also raises rents. The marginal impact of increased confidence on pledgeable
income decreases with πt (P (πt) is concave). Moreover, under condition (10) pledgeable income is not
monotonic in πt. While initial improvements in confidence trigger an increase in pledgeable income,
when high levels of confidence are reached, the increase in rent dominates the increase in expected
surplus and pledgeable income decreases with πt.
4.2 Equilibrium with effort
When effort is requested from the agent, there are two possible regimes, depending on whether the
incentive compatibility condition binds or not. In the first regime, the market clearing condition
determines the equilibrium compensation of the managers, as in the previous section, i.e.,
Mt =M∗t s.t. G(M
∗
t ) = F (St −M∗t )
as in (6). For this to be the equilibrium, it must be that the incentive compatibility condition holds
for M∗t , i.e.,
M∗t ≥ Rt. (11)
As illustrated in Figure 2, in this regime the supply and demand curves on the labour market intersect
above Rt, so that the incentive compatibility condition does not bind.
In the second regime, as illustrated in Figure 3, the supply and demand curves on the labour
market intersect below Rt. Thus, the incentive compatibility condition binds, i.e.,
M∗t < Rt. (12)
and the expected managerial compensation is
Mt = Rt. (13)
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Since this is above M∗t , managers employed in the innovative sector earn greater expected compensa-
tion than in the observable effort case. Thus, although they are competitive, they earn rents. Such
rents make working in the innovative sector very attractive. Indeed the number of managers who want
to work in that sector is above the demand for their services, i.e.,
G(Mt) = G(Rt) > F (St −Mt).
Thus there is rationing in the labour market, as in the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984).
For simplicity consider the case where ν is uniformly distributed over [0, ν¯] and ρ is uniform over
[0, ρ¯], i.e.,
G(ν) =
ν
ν¯
, F (ρ) =
ρ
ρ¯
.
In that case the market clearing condition (6) defining M∗t becomes:
M∗t
ν¯
=
St −M∗t
ρ¯
.
Thus:
M∗t = βS, (14)
where:
β =
ν¯
ν¯ + ρ¯
∈ [0, 1].
The compensation of the manager is equal to a fraction (β) of the value created by the firm.
This fraction reflects the relative values of the outside opportunities of managers and investors in
the traditional sector. When the outside opportunities of managers, measured by their skills in the
traditional sector, are high and the opportunities of the investors in that sector are poor, the market
clearing compensation of the managers in the innovative sector is high.
The condition under which the incentive compatibility condition does not bind, (11), is equivalent
to the condition that the pledgeable income be greater than the expected income of the investors in
the first best
St −M∗t ≤ Pt. (15)
After simple manipulations, this leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 3: Consider the case where effort is not observable, but is requested and F and G
are uniform.
If
B
∆
< βY, (16)
then the incentive compatibility condition is not binding and the compensation of managers is set by
the market clearing condition (6) as in the first best.
If
B
∆ˆ
< βY <
B
∆
, (17)
there exists a threshold value π¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that, for πt ≤ π¯ the incentive compatibility condition is
not binding and the compensation of managers is set by the market clearing condition (6), while for
πt > π¯, the compensation of managers is set by the incentive compatibility condition (13).
If
βY <
B
∆ˆ
, (18)
the incentive compatibility condition always binds and the compensation of managers is set by the
incentive compatibility condition (13).
Inequality (16) holds when the share of expected output that has to be left to managers in the
first best is larger than what they must receive for incentives reason. This arises when B∆Y is low, so
that the moral hazard problem is not severe and induces no distortion in equilibrium. In this case,
the expected net cashflow obtained by investors in the innovative sector is: St −M∗t . When B∆Y is
large, inequality (16) does not hold and the agency problem is severe and the incentive compatibility
condition can bind. Figure 4 illustrates what happens in that case when (17) holds. The figure
illustrates that there exists a threshold π¯ such that, when πt > π¯, the IC binds and the expected net
cashflow obtained by investors in the innovative sector is: St −Rt = Pt.
4.3 Equilibrium without effort
Now turn to the case where effort is not requested from the agent in equilibrium. In that case the
expected output from the project and the expected wage earned by the managers are given in the next
lemma:
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Lemma 1: When there is no effort the expected output is
Sˆt = {[1− μ(1− p)− ∆ˆ] + πt[μ(p¯− p) + (∆ˆ−∆)]}Y,
and the expected wage earned by managers is
Mˆt = {[1− μ(1− p)− ∆ˆ] + πt[μ(p¯− p) + (∆ˆ−∆)]}mt.
When there is no effort in equilibrium, the demand for managers is: F (Sˆt − Mˆt) while he supply
of managers is: G(Mˆt +B). The market clearing expected wage without effort is Mˆ∗t is such that
F (Sˆt − Mˆ∗t ) = G(Mˆ∗t +B).
Using this market clearing condition, the next proposition spells out the equilibrium wage arising in
the uniform case when effort is not requested.
Proposition 4: Assume F and G are uniform. If effort is not requested in equilibrium, then the
labour market for managers clears, the expected compensation of managers is
Mˆ∗t = βSˆt − (1− β)B,
and their total expected utility is β(Sˆt +B), while that of investors is (1− β)(Sˆt +B).
When effort is not exerted, the total expected value created by each firm is Sˆt+B. Since the agent
does not exert effort, no rent needs to be left to managers and the market clears. Thus the shares
of the total value created obtained by managers and investors simply reflect their outside options in
the traditional sector. Correspondingly, managers get a fraction β of Sˆt + B while investors get the
complementary fraction.
4.4 Is there effort in equilibrium?
We now investigate if effort prevails in equilibrium. Consider a candidate equilibrium, where effort
is requested. Could a pair manager—investor be better off by deviating to a contract which would
not request effort? If there is no such profitable deviation, then effort is requested in equilibrium.
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Symmetrically, consider a candidate equilibrium where effort is not requested. Could a pair manager—
investor be better off by deviating to a contract that would request effort? Again, if there is no such
profitable deviation, there exists an equilibrium without effort. The following proposition, illustrated
in Figure 4, states the conditions on parameter values under which one of the candidate equilibria or
the other prevails in the uniform case.
Proposition 5: Consider the case where F and G are uniform and assume
{β + (1− β)
2∆
1− μ(1− p¯) + (1− β)∆}∆ <
B
Y
< β∆ˆ.
Then there exists a threshold value πˆ > π¯ such that effort is requested in equilibrium for πt ≤ πˆ,
while equilibrium involves no effort for larger values of πt.
The intuition behind the proposition is the following: As long as πt ≤ πˆ, the rents that must be left
to the managers are sufficiently small that the pledgeable income is greater than the expected income
investors would get if effort was not requested. So, for these values of πt, investors prefer to request
effort, and it is implemented in equilibrium. In contrast, for πt > πˆ, the rents which must be left to
managers to incentivize effort are so high that investors prefer to give up on incentives and allow for
the greater default risk resulting from shirking. The resulting increase in risk is socially costly, it does
not arise in equilibrium when effort is observable, but it may occur in presence of moral hazard.
5 Empirical implications and calibration of the model
In this section, we draw the empirical implications of our theoretical analysis for the financial industry.
Note that our model is not relevant for all parts of the financial industry and all periods. It only
applies to periods with significant innovations, uncertainty about the strength of these innovations
and informational asymmetries between investors and managers. Thus, our model does not apply to
standard banking activities during periods with little financial innovation, e.g., the 1950s or the 1960s,
or financial innovations with no or limited information asymmetry.12 In contrast, our model is relevant
12For example the securitization of standard (not subprime) bank loans is commonly viewed as a success. It started in
1968, when the GNMA created the passthrough security for mortgages guaranteed by the US government. It was later
extended to broader classes of loans, including those guaranteed by Government Sponsored Entities (Fannie Mae and
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to analyze the flow of financial innovations that took place at the beginning of this century, such as
e.g., structured finance, hedge funds and private equity funds. It is also relevant for previous waves
of financial innovations, with uncertainty and information asymmetry, such as, e.g., the stock market
boom of 1920s, the growth of synthetic portfolio insurance in the early 1980s, or the development of
junk-bonds markets from late 1970s until they crashed in the 1980s.
5.1 Risk taking, fat tails and endogenous crises
Fat tails in the model: As stated in Proposition 5, when πt becomes greater than πˆ, the
innovative industry switches to the risk-taking regime. Correspondingly, the distribution of default
risk is distorted towards more failures. This implies that, after a series of successes, fat tails and
crises can emerge endogenously. To see this compare the distribution of aggregate default rates for
a relatively low value of πt: π− < πˆ and a larger value of πt: π+ > πˆ. The former prevails when
the innovative industry is new and has a short track record. The latter prevails when the innovative
industry has been operating with success for several years. In the former case, the aggregate default
rate is 0 with probability π−p¯+ (1− π−)p and μ with complementary probability. In the latter case,
it is ∆ with probability π+p¯+(1−π+)pλ, ∆¯ with probability (1−π+)p(1−λ), μ+∆ with probability
π+(1 − p¯) + (1 − π+)(1 − p)λ and, finally, μ + ∆¯ with probability (1 − π+)(1 − p)(1 − λ). Thus,
when the probability that the innovative industry is strong is greater than or equal to π+, very large
aggregate default rate μ+ ∆¯ can be observed. Such fat tails in the distribution of aggregate risk do
not arise when there is no moral hazard, since in that case risk—prevention effort is always exerted in
equilibrium.
Calibration: The assumptions underlying our model are descriptive of salient features of the
mortgage subprime industry : It relied on new techniques,13 there was uncertainty about the strength
Freddie Mac) as well as more risky loans such as auto, credit card, commercial mortgage, student and business loans.
It’s likely that this financial innovation was not subject to major informational asymmetries. So far, it has been immune
to crashes.
13These new techniques enabled the industry to i) attract new categories of borrowers previously denied access to
credit (e.g., “low document loans” or “option mortgages”) and ii) transfer risks (e.g., tranching). Brunnermeier (2009)
offers an illuminating analysis of the “originate to distribute model.”
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of that industry,14 and there was information asymmetry regarding the exact structure and content
of the portfolios resulting from tranching. The stylized facts from that industry are in line with the
properties of our equilibrium, in particular the boom and bust cycle (illustrated in Figure 5, borrowed
from Jaffee 2008) and the emergence of fat tails and endogenous crises. To show this more precisely,
we now calibrate tour model to match some statistics from the MBS industry.
The calibration is designed so that, during the bliss years of the “great moderation” (2002, 2003,
2004) managers exert effort and correspondingly aggregate default risk is between 0 and μ. As il-
lustrated in Figure 6 (also borrowed from Jaffee 2008), for loans originated until 2004 subprime
delinquency rates two years after origination were less than 10%. To match these observations, we set
μ = 6%.
In line with the literature (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009), we make the plausible as-
sumption that there was no negative aggregate shock during the bliss years of the “great moderation”
(from 2002 to 2005.) Also, we design the calibration so that equilibrium switches to the risk—taking
regime (i.e. πt reaches πˆ) in 2005. This switch rationalizes the finding by Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2008), that the decline in performance for loans made in 2005-2006 cannot be fully explained by
observable composition effects (i.e. changes in the types of subprime loans and in observable borrower
characteristics) or economic conditions, but reflects a decline in the quality standards of lenders. Fur-
thermore, as pointed by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009), their empirical findings suggest that
lenders were aware of the deterioration in loan quality. This is also what happens in our model.
In the risk—taking regime, aggregate default rates are between ∆ and μ + ∆¯. Figure 6, shows
that subprime delinquency rates two years after origination rose to around 12% for loans originated
in 2005, and more than 20% for loans originated afterwards.15 To match these observations, we set
∆ = 12%, ∆¯ = 22%.
Finally, we set i) β = .5, i.e., before rents the compensation of managers employed in the sector is
50% of the profits, which is in line with anecdotal evidence, ii) BY = .077%, i.e., the private benefits
from shirking are slightly lower than 8% of the potential profits of the institution, and iii) λ = .6,
p¯ = .8, p = .2. The latter three probabilities are key parameters of the Bayesian updating conducted
by agents. These values of the parameters ensure that, after three years without negative shock (2002,
14 In particular there was uncertainty about the probability of a nationwide drop in real—estate prices.
15The time pattern of default rates after one year is similar.
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2003, 2004), confidence becomes so high that the equilibrium switches to the risk—taking regime in
2005.
For these parameter values, the distribution of aggregate default risk in the effort and risk—taking
regimes generated by our model around the equilibrium switching point is depicted in Figure 7. The
figure illustrates the shift of the distribution of aggregate defaults, and the fat tails of that distribution.
The realization of the high default event, made possible by equilibrium shirking, corresponds to the
occurrence of the endogenous crisis.
5.2 Managers’ rents and investors’ returns
Our model implies that during innovation waves, if the performance of the industry is initially good,
it grows and attracts more and more skilled managers. At some point these managers earn rents, i.e.,
their pay exceeds the market clearing wage they would receive in a frictionless market. These rents
arise in equilibrium, in spite of competition between managers, because of incentive constraints, in
line with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They lead to desequilibrium in the labor market, as the supply
of would be finance managers exceeds the demand.
All these theoretical results are consistent with the empirical findings of Philippon and Reshef
(2008). They observe that during the 1920s and after the 1990s, there was a burst of financial
innovation accompanied by an increase in the complexity of jobs and skills and managers’ pay in
the finance sector. They find evidence of rents in the financial industry, associated with involuntary
unemployment in that sector.
Another implication of our model is that, when there is a series of successful years (without negative
aggregate shocks), one will simultaneously observe i) an increase in the amount of funds invested (due
to increased confidence) and ii) a decline in the investors’ net returns from these investments (due
to the growth in rents.) This, in turn, implies that time—weighted average returns will be larger
than than money—weighted ones. Indeed, since the amount of funds invested increases, time—weighted
returns place relatively more weight on early years (which have greater realized net returns) than
money—weighted ones. This is in line with the recent empirical finding by Dichev and Yu (2010)
that, for investors in hedge funds, dollar weighted returns are 3 to 7 percent lower than corresponding
buy—and—hold fund (time weighted) returns.
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6 Conclusion
This paper offers a theory of the dynamics of innovative industries based on two key assumptions:
i) new industries are not well known, and therefore learning will be conducted about the strength of
these innovations, ii) in such industries it is difficult for outsiders to understand and monitor managers’
actions, and therefore there is moral hazard. These assumptions are in line with major features of
financial innovations waves, especially that of the early 2000s. Our theory shows how moral hazard
can lead to endogenous crises and fat tails in the distribution of aggregate default. A calibration of
our model generates figures in line with stylized facts from the recent boom and bust cycle in the
finance sector.
Our theory thus uncovers fundamental economic forces implying that innovation waves raise the
risk of endogenous crises. It also delivers several policy implications. Large rents offer an early signal
that systemic risk is rising. Information asymmmetry, which is at the root of endogenous crises, should
be mitigated by increased transparency, in markets (e.g., exchanges versus OTC) or in the disclosure
of positions and trades (e.g., to CCPs). Policy intervention to increase transparency is especially
valuable when initially successful innovations lead to high confidence and large rents.
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Proofs:
Proof of Proposition 2:
The pledgeable income is:
P (πt) = [(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt]Y −
(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt
∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)
B.
Its first derivative with respect to πt is
P 0(πt) = μ(p¯− p)Y −
(p¯− p)μ∆ˆ+ (1− μ+ μp)(∆ˆ−∆)
[∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)]2
B.
That is
μ(p¯− p)Y −
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
[∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)]2
B.
Note that
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆ > 0
because ∆ˆ > ∆ and p¯ > p.
The second derivative is:
P 00(πt) = −2πt(∆ˆ−∆)
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
[∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)]3
B < 0.
Now
P
0
(1) = μ(p¯− p)Y −
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆2
B.
Thus, P 0(1) < 0 if and only if
μ(p¯− p)Y <
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆2
B.
Furthermore
P 0(0) = μ(p¯− p)Y −
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆ˆ2
B.
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Thus, P 0(0) > 0 if and only if
μ(p¯− p)Y >
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆ˆ2
B.
Hence, P 0(0) > 0 and P 0(1) < 0 if:
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆2
B > μ(p¯− p)Y >
(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ− (1− μ+ μp)∆
∆ˆ2
B.
That is
[(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ
∆
− (1− μ+ μp)] > μ(p¯− p)∆Y
B
> (
∆
∆ˆ
)2[(1− μ+ μp¯)∆ˆ
∆
− (1− μ+ μp)].
QED
Proof of Proposition 3:
Substituting the market clearing managerial compensation (14) into (15), we obtain that the
condition under which the incentive compatibility condition does not bind is (1− β)St ≤ Pt,that is:
(1− β)[(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt]Y
≤ [(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt]Y −
[(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt]B
∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)
.
Simplifying both sides by [(1− μ+ μp) + (p¯− p)μπt] and rearranging, we obtain
βY ≥ B
∆ˆ− πt(∆ˆ−∆)
. (19)
As πt goes from 0 to 1, the right—hand—side of (19) increases from B∆ˆto
B
∆ .Hence, if
βY ≥ B
∆
. (20)
then the incentive compatibility condition never binds, if
βY <
B
∆ˆ
, (21)
it always binds, and if
B
∆ˆ
< βY <
B
∆
, (22)
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then there exists a threshold value of πt, strictly between 0 and 1, such that the IC does not bind if
and only if πt is below this threshold.
QED
Proof of Lemma 1:
The proof stems directly from the computation of the probability that output Y will be generated
when there is no effort:
[πt(p¯(1−∆) + (1− p¯)(1− μ−∆)) + (1− πt)(p(1− ∆ˆ) + (1− p)(1− μ− ∆ˆ))].
After some manipulations, this simplifies to
[πt(1− μ−∆+ μp¯) + (1− πt)(1− μ− ∆ˆ+ μp))],
which in turn simplifies to
[1− μ(1− p)− ∆ˆ] + πt[μ(p¯− p) + π(∆ˆ−∆)].
QED
Proof of Proposition 5:
The preliminary step of the proof is to compare the following three quantities, which are all
functions of πt: (1− β)St, (1− β)(Sˆt +B) and Pt. Note the following:
• (1 − β)St and (1 − β)(Sˆt + B) are linear and increasing in πt, and ∆Y > B implies that
(1− β)St > (1− β)(Sˆt +B).
• BY < β∆ˆ implies that, P (πt = 0) > (1− β)S(πt = 0).
• P (πt = 1) < (1− β)[S(πt = 1) +B] is implied by {β + (1−β)
2∆
1−μ(1−p¯)+(1−β)∆}∆ < BY .
The functions (1 − β)St, (1 − β)(Sˆt + B) and Pt are plotted in Figure 4. As can be seen in the
figure, there exists a pair of probabilities π¯ < πˆ such that
P (π) > (1− β)S,∀π < π¯
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and
P (π) < (1− β)(Sˆ +B),∀π > πˆ.
The remainder of the proof consists in three steps, each one considering a candidate equilibrium
and spanning the different possible values of πt.
First, we consider the case where πt < π¯. Consider the case where effort is requested. Since πt < π¯,
the incentive compatibility condition does not bind, we are at the first best and there is no scope for
deviations to no effort. Consequently, for πt < π¯, there is an equilibrium with effort.
Second, turn to the case where πˆ > πt > π¯. As above consider the candidate equilibrium where
effort is requested. The investor receives Pt and the manager Rt. The sum of the two is St. Could
a manager and an investor both prefer to deviate to a contract with effort? In that deviation, the
total value created by the firm would be Sˆt +B. Under our assumptions, this is lower than the total
value created in the candidate equilibrium, St. Hence, the investor could not both agree to such the
deviation. Consequently, for πˆ > πt > π¯, there is an equilibrium with effort.
Third, focus on the case where πt > πˆ > π¯. Consider a candidate equilibrium with effort. In
that candidate equilibrium, in the innovative sector, managers would receive Rt while investors would
obtain Pt. Would an investor be better off deviating to no effort? This deviating investor could hire
a manager from the traditional sector. The cheapest of these managers would be the marginal one,
with type ν = G−1(F (Pt)) = β1−βPt. Hiring this manager to implement the project without effort,
the investor would obtain Sˆt + B − β1−βPt. This is profitable for the investor if that leads to greater
expected profits for her, i.e., if
Sˆt +B −
β
1− βPt ≥ Pt.
That is (1− β)(Sˆt +B) ≥ Pt,which holds by construction for πt ≥ πˆ. Hence, effort cannot prevail in
equilibrium. Now, consider a candidate equilibrium without effort. The investor receives (1−β)Sˆt and
the manager βSˆt. Could a manager and an investor both prefer to deviate to a contract with effort?
In that deviation, the investor could at most get Pt. By construction, P (πt) < (1− β)Sˆt, hence, the
investor could not agree to such a deviation. Consequently, for πt > πˆ, there is an equilibrium without
effort.
QED
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Figure 1: The structure of uncertainty in period t
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Figure 2: Supply, demand & rents when there is no rationing
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Mt is the expected compensation of the manager. G(Mt) is the mass of managers who,
given this compensation, prefer to work in the speculative sector, and F(St-Mt) the mass 
of investors who also choose that sector. Mt* is the market clearing expected compensation
and Rt the rent which must be left to managers to incentivize effort. When Mt* > Rt there 
is no rationing.
Figure 3: Supply, demand & rents with rationing
Mt is the expected compensation of the manager. G(Mt) is the mass of managers who,
given this compensation, prefer to work in the speculative sector, and F(St-Mt) the mass 
of investors who also choose that sector. Mt* is the market clearing expected compensation
and Rt the rent which must be left to managers to incentivize effort. When Mt* < Rt there is 
rationing.
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Figure 4: Pledgeable income & expected profit
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Pt is the pledgeable income. (1-β)St is the equilibrium expected profit of investors if IC does
not bind and effort is exerted. (1-β)(St+B) is the expected profit of investors without effort. ^
Figure 5: Subprime Mortgage Originations, Annual Volume and Percent of Total
Figure 6: Subprime Delinquency Rate 60+ Days, By Age and Year of Origination
Figure 7: The distribution of aggregate default rates
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The histogram plots the distribution of aggregate default rates in the calibration. On the 
horizontal axis are the different possible aggregate default rates in equilibrium. On the 
vertical axis are the probabilities of these different equilibrium outcomes. The two bars on 
the left correspond to the outcomes in the effort regime. The four bars on the right are the 
outcomes in the risk-taking regime. 
